Rehabilitating the victim is as important as punishing the accused, says the Supreme Court while lamenting the failure of the courts in awarding compensation to the victims in terms of Section 357(1) Cr.P.C

Lamenting the failure of the courts in awarding compensation to the victims in terms of Section 357(1) CrPC, the Supreme Court of India in a recent judgment (Manohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others) has emphasised that rehabilitating the victim is as important as punishing the accused. The Court also highlighted the need to compensate the victim in criminal cases, which, it said is integral to just sentencing. 

 

The Apex Court has highlighted the need to compensate the victim in criminal cases, which it said, is integral to just sentencing

“Order of sentence in a criminal case needs due application of mind. The Court has to give attention not only to the nature of crime, prescribed sentence, mitigating and aggravating circumstances to strike just balance in needs of society and fairness to the accused, but also to keep in mind the need to give justice to the victim of crime. In spite of legislative changes and decisions of this Court, this aspect at times escapes attention. Rehabilitating victim is as important as punishing the accused. Victim’s plight cannot be ignored even when a crime goes unpunished for want of adequate evidence,” said a Bench of the Apex Court consisting of Justice T.S. Thakur and Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel, while hearing an appeal preferred against the order of acquittal passed by the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur.

The case involved as many as 13 accused who were tried on the allegations that they assaulted and caused injuries to PW-5- Manohar Singh, appellant, Devi Singh PW-4, Maan Singh PW-11 and Karan Singh PW-1 on 29th October, 1980 at around 2 P.M. with a view to disturb the possession of the complainant party on the agricultural land in question.  The trial Court convicted the accused including respondent Nos.2 to 11 and one Mool Singh, son of Jaswant Singh who died during pendency of the proceedings. The Sessions Court had set aside the conviction of the accused for offences other than the one under Section 323 IPC but maintained the conviction under Section 323 IPC. The sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial Court was also set aside and the accused were granted probation subject to fine of Rs.5,000/- which was to be paid to the victim. The injured PWs, namely, Karan Singh, Devi Singh and Maan Singh entered into the compromise and compounded the offence qua them but the appellant filed a revision in the High Court which was dismissed.

The appellant before the Apex Court contended that the Court of Sessions erred in setting aside the conviction for offences other than Section 323 and also erred in granting benefit of probation. The fine imposed was not adequate and having regard to number of injuries and their nature, adequate compensation ought to have been granted. The appellant received as many as 10 injuries including an incised wound in the parietal region by sharp edged weapon, a muscle deep injury on the front of left leg and a bone deep injury just above the front of left leg. “Even if technically, the injury could be held to be simple instead of grievous, the sentence should have been adequate and in any case, due compensation ought to have been granted,” contended the counsel for the appellant.

The Apex Court, taking into account the fact that 35 years had passed since the date of occurrence said that “while it may not be appropriate to impose the sentence of imprisonment at this stage, having regard to the nature and extent of injuries, the appellant-complainant deserves to be duly compensated.” It was in this context that the above observations on the need to compensate the victim were made by the Court.

Elucidating on the various aspects to be considered by the Court in the matter of compensating the victim, the Bench said: “Just compensation to the victim has to be fixed having regard to the medical and other expenses, pain and suffering, loss of earning and other relevant factors. While punishment to the accused is one aspect, determination of just compensation to the victim is the other. At times, evidence is not available in this regard. Some guess work in such a situation is inevitable. Compensation is payable under Section 357 and 357-A. While under section 357, financial capacity of the accused has to be kept in mind, Section 357-A under which compensation comes out of State funds, has to be invoked to make up the requirement of just compensation.”

The Apex Court also referred to several decisions on the subject including State of Gujarat and anr. vs. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, (1998) 7 SCC 392 , Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770, Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh [(1988) 4 SCC 551 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 984] , Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1978) 4 SCC 111 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 549], Balraj v. State of U.P [(1994) 4 SCC 29 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 823], Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab [(1995) 6 SCC 593 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1132], and Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. [(2007) 6 SCC 528 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 209] to highlight the fact that the Supreme Court had recommended to all courts to exercise the power available under Section 357 CrPC liberally so as to meet the ends of justice.

The Apex Court also referred to its decision in State of A.P. v. Polamala Raju [(2000) 7 SCC 75 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1284] wherein it had set aside the judgment of the High Court for non-application of mind to the question of sentencing and held “..it is an obligation of the sentencing court to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence…

 ..while the award or refusal of compensation in a particular case may be within the court’s discretion, there exists a mandatory duty on the court to apply its mind to the question in every criminal case. Application of mind to the question is best disclosed by recording reasons for awarding/refusing compensation. It is axiomatic that for any exercise involving application of mind, the Court ought to have the necessary material which it would evaluate to arrive at a fair and reasonable conclusion. It is also beyond dispute that the occasion to consider the question of award of compensation would logically arise only after the court records a conviction of the accused. Capacity of the accused to pay which constitutes an important aspect of any order under Section 357 CrPC would involve a certain enquiry albeit summary unless of course the facts as emerging in the course of the trial are so clear that the court considers it unnecessary to do so. Such an enquiry can precede an order on sentence to enable the court to take a view, both on the question of sentence and compensation that it may in its wisdom decide to award to the victim or his/her family.” 

The Apex Court, in the light of the precedents on the point, thereafter proceeded to set aside the fine of Rs. 5,000/- and directed the surviving respondents (accused) to pay the appellant a sum of Rs.50,000/- as compensation under Section 357(3) within two months, and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months.

IPL spot-fixing and betting scandal : Supreme Court emphasises 'zero tolerance' for wrong doing in a seminal judgment

The Supreme Court in its seminal judgment in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar has come down heavily on the malpractices and conflict of interests of those who not only hold positions of influence in the BCCI but also own franchises and teams competing in the IPL format that have left many cricketing enthusiasts and followers of the game worried and deeply suspicious about what goes on in the name of the game in India. 

N Srinivasan has been barred from contesting the upcoming elections to the BCCI by the Supreme Court unless he is prepared to give up his ownership of the Chennai Super Kings

In a judgment delivered on Thursday by a Bench consisting of Justice TS Thakur and Fakir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifullah, the Supreme Court has struck a blow to N Srinivasan’s role in Indian cricket by effectively asking the sidelined BCCI president to choose between his role in the board and his ownership of the Chennai Super Kings franchise. Srinivasan has been barred from contesting in the board's elections - which the court ordered to be held in the next six weeks - until he gives up his commercial interest in Chennai Super Kings franchise. 

Adjudicating on the legality of the constitution of a committee of 2 retired judges of the Madras High Court constituted by the BCCI to investigate charges of corruption in the 2013 spot-fixing case, the Court struck down the BCCI's controversial amendment to Rule 6.2.4 of its Rules that allowed board officials to have commercial interests in the IPL and the Champions League T20, calling it "the true villain of the situation at hand." This amendment, inserted into the BCCI constitution in 2008 after the IPL had been formed, had made it possible for Srinivasan to be a BCCI official and a franchise owner. 

The Court however gave Srinivasan a clean chit insofar as the allegations against him of a 'cover-up' in the betting scandal was concerned. 

 

What are the implications of the Apex Court judgment on N Srinivasan, the IPL franchises, and the BCCI? 

Here's presenting a detailed analysis of the judgment:

 

The background facts:

Two writ petitions were filed in public interest by the Cricket Association of Bihar before the High Court of Bombay for several reliefs including a direction to the BCCI to recall its order constituting a probe panel comprising two retired Judges of Madras High Court to enquire into the allegations of betting and spot fixing in the Indian Premier League (IPL) made among others, against Gurunath Meiyappan. 

The High Court by its order dated 30^th July, 2013 granted that relief but declined the other reliefs sought for by the petitioner, including reconstitution of the panel to conduct an enquiry under the supervision of the High Court. 

Aggrieved by the High Court order to the extent that it declared the constitution of the Probe Commission to be illegal and ultra vires of the relevant rules and regulations, the BCCI preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court.  

The Cricket Association of Bihar also approached the Supreme Court aggrieved by the fact that the High Court did not grant its prayers for removal of N. Srininivasan as BCCI President and cancellation of the franchise favouring Chennai Super Kings and Rajasthan Royals for the IPL matches to be conducted in future. 

The Association also challenged the validity of the amendment to Rule 6.2.4 permitting Administrators of BCCI to acquire or hold commercial interests in the IPL and Champions League T20 tournaments.

Rule 6.2.4 before amendment was in the following words:

“No Administrators shall have, directly or indirectly, any commercial interest in the matches or events  conducted by the Board.”

The impugned amendment added the following words at the end of the above Rule:

 “excluding events like IPL or Champions League Twenty 20.”  

One of the main grounds of challenge to the amendment raised by the Association was that it was mala fide inasmuch as the whole object underlying the same was to protect the grant of Chennai Franchise to Mr. Srinivasan’s India Cements Ltd. which was as on the date of the grant in clear breach of Rule 6.2.4 as it existed before its amendment.

The issues formulated and the findings of the Supreme Court thereon: 

(1)     Whether the BCCI is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 and if it is not, whether it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 

The Apex Court finding that the functions discharged by the Board are in the nature of ‘public functions’ and the Board is hence amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the Apex court, reaffirming the decision in Zee Telefilms Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 649 held that BCCI is not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, as it was an autonomous body, neither created by statute nor given financial assistance or controlled by the Government. 

(2)     Whether Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra were ‘team officials’ of their respective IPL teams - Chennai Super Kings and Rajasthan Royals? If so, whether allegations of betting levelled against them stand proved?

The Apex Court affirmed the findings of the Probe Committee constituted by it under the chairmanship of Justice Mudgal that Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra were ‘team officials’ of CSK and Rajasthan Royals respectively, and they had indulged in betting. 

(3) What consequential action in the nature of punishment is permissible under the relevant Rules and Regulations, and against whom?  

The Apex Court held that both Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra as ‘team officials’ of CSK and Rajasthan Royals respectively were liable for imposition of sanctions against them under Rule 6.4 of the IPL Operational Rules, which could result in their suspension from being involved in IPL matches for a specified period or even lead to suspension of their team itself from taking part in the tournament.  The Apex Court also said that both Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra as ‘team officials’ of CSK and Rajasthan Royals respectively were also liable for sanctions to be imposed by the Disciplinary Committee of the BCCI under Article 6.2 of the Anti-Corruption Code which has been adopted by the Board. 

The Court also said that both of them would be liable for punishment/ sanctions under the Code of conduct for Players and Team Officials. 

The Court further held that the BCCI-IPL could terminate the agreements with the frachises concerned- CSK and Rajasthan Royals under Clause 11.3 of the Franchise agreement entered into between the Board and the IPL franchise owners. 

(4) Whether allegations of cover up, levelled against Mr. N. Srinivasan stand proved?

The Court noted that the Probe Committee constituted by it had recorded a specific finding that the allegations of Match fixing, spot-fixing or betting were not proved against Mr. Srinivasan in the course of the enquiry.

Accordingly, the Court said that it could not be said with any amount of certainty that the charge of attempted cover up leveled against Mr. Srinivasan stands proved.

(5) Whether Regulation 6.2.4 to the extent it permits administrators to have commercial interest in the IPL, Champions League and Twenty-20 events is legally bad?

The Apex Court found that Rule 6.2.4 disregards the potential conflict of interest which will arise between an administrator’s  duty as a functionary of the BCCI on the one hand and his interest as the holder of any such commercial interest on the other.

The Court added that it is the amendment which attempts to validate what was on the date of the award of the franchise invalid as Rule 6.2.4 did not as on that date permit an administrator to have any commercial interest in any event organized by BCCI. 

The Court said the amendment permits situations in which conflict of interest would grossly erode the confidence of the people in the authenticity, purity and integrity of the game and hence unsustainable and impermissible in law. 

The Court, while striking down the amendment however said, it “may not be feasible at this stage to interfere with the award of the franchise to ICL especially when hundreds of crores have been invested by the franchisee”

The Court accordingly declared the amendment as void and ineffective.

(6)     Whether allegations levelled against Mr. Sundar Raman, Chief Operating Officer IPL, stand proved? If so, to what effect?

The Court said that the observations of the Probe Committee under the chairmanship of Justice Mudgal regarding the role and conduct of Mr. Sundar Raman, Chief Operating Officer IPL give rise to a serious suspicion about his involvement in the betting affairs of the team owners/officials apart from suggesting that having received information about betting activities in connection with IPL matches, he remained totally inert in the matter instead of taking suitable action warranted under the circumstances.

It said that further investigation and probe into the activities and conduct of Mr. Sundar Raman was warranted. 

7)       Orders/directions to be issued

The Apex Court went on to constitute a 3 member Committee headed by the former Chief Justice of India Mr. R.M. Lodha to examine the role of  Mr. Sundar Raman with or without further investigation, into his activities, and if found guilty, impose a suitable  punishment upon him on behalf of BCCI. The Court also asked the Committee take a call on the quantum of punishment to be awarded to the parties concerned after issuing notice to all those likely to be affected and provide them an opportunity of hearing in the matter. The Court said that the order passed by the Committee shall be final and binding upon BCCI and the parties concerned. The Committee will have, in addition to Justice R.M. Lodha, Justice R.V. Raveendran and Justice Ashok Bhan as its members. 

The Court, while allowing elections to the various posts in the BCCI to be held within 6 weeks of the date of its order, forbade persons having commercial interest from contesting the polls, “till such time the person concerned holds such commercial interest or till the Committee considers and awards suitable punishment to those liable for the same; whichever is later”.

The new Committee has also been asked to "examine and make suitable recommendations to the BCCI for such reforms in its practices and procedures and such amendments in the Memorandum of Association, Rules and Regulations as may be considered necessary and proper.”

The Committee has been requested by the Court to conclude its proceedings, as far as possible, within a period of 6 months.

***

What the judgment means to N. Srinivasan?

The good news for Mr. N. Srinivasan is that he has been acquitted of the charges of cover-up leveled against him. The bad news for him however is that the charge of having conflict of interest effectively stands proved against him. The judgment means that he now has to choose between the BCCI and Chennai Super Kings, and cannot continue to be the BCCI President and owner of Chennai Super Kings at the same time.

 

What does the judgment mean for the BCCI?

The Court has directed the Board has to hold elections within six weeks. It will in all probability have a new president, unless N. Srinivasan cuts his ties with CSK.

What does it mean for the IPL and more specifically, CSK and Rajasthan Royals?

There may be no immediate threat to IPL for the 2015 season as it may not be realistically possible for the Committee to conclude its proceedings before the start of the IPL season.

The fate of the Chennai Super Kings and the Rajasthan Royals and their participation in future edition/s of IPL, if any, hangs in the balance right now as the Committee constituted by the Supreme Court under the chairmanship of former Chief Justice of India, R.M. Lodha will decide on the quantum of punishment to be awarded to the said franchises.