Saturday 22 November 2014

Provisions regarding arrest of a vessel do not extend to the arrest of an Indian ship by an admiralty Court in India, rules the High Court of Kerala

The High Court of Kerala, has held in Chembolaparambu General Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. M.V. KAVARATHI1 that what is contemplated under Admiralty Jurisdiction of a High Court in India is only with regard to the arrest of a foreign ship which happens to be in Indian waters. When it is confined to a foreign ship which happens to be in Indian waters, any ship owned by the President of India or the Union of India, or by a Indian company incorporated or situated in India or by a partnership firm in India or even by a Citizen in India cannot be arrested by invoking the admiralty jurisdiction or any High Courts in India.

The Court was considering the prayer of the plaintiff in Admiralty Suit No. 4 of 2014, Chembolaparambu General Engineers, who had filed an interlocutory application filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking an order of arrest of M.V. KAVARATHI, a vessel owned by an Indian and represented by her master, which was within the waters of India/Cochin port and to keep the vessel under safe arrest until further orders of the Court. The case of the plaintiff was that it had carried out repairs/engineering works on the vessel, M.V. KAVARATHI, and out of a total sum of Rs. 82,87,508.45/- due towards the cost of the said works done, the owner of M.V. KAVARATHI had made only a part payment of Rs.26,55,615/- and that despite several demands througn notices, the owner of the vessel had not cared to settle the liability. It was in this context that the plaintiff had preferred the application seeking arrest of the said vessel till the obtaining of sufficient security for the plaint claim. The claim of the plaintiff was resisted by the owner of the vessel on the ground that the provisions regarding arrest of a vessel do not extend to the arrest of an Indian ship by an admiralty court of India. 

Justice B. Kemal Pasha accepted the contention of the defendants and relying on the ratio formulated by the Apex Court in M.V. Elisabeth & Ors. v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd.., etc2 held that the presence of a foreign ship in Indian waters is a condition precedent for invoking the admiralty jurisdiction of a High Court in India and that it is evident that arrest of such a ship can be made only when it is a foreign ship, and further, when it happened to be in Indian waters.
The Court accordingly dismissed the said interlocutory application, and also ordered return of the plaint under Order VII R.10 C.P.C. to be presented to the Court in which the suit ought to have been instituted, as the Court held, in an application filed by the first defendant seeking rejection of the plaint, that the questions involved in the suit were questions which arise from a contract for repair works of an Indian ship by the plaintiff which does not involve any jurisdiction for the arrest of such an Indian ship and that the suit is merely an ordinary money suit which is triable by an ordinary civil court competent to try it. 

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1. 2014 (4) KLT 246
2. AIR 1993 SC 1014



High Court stays decision of ‘Tree Protection Committee’ to cut down trees standing in front of Church for construction of its compound wall, following a challenge by an environmental activist



The High Court of Kerala has passed an interim order dated 19.11.2014 staying the decision taken by the ‘Tree Protection Committee’ to cut and remove the trees standing in front of the St Antonys Church Ammadom, Thrissur for construction of the compound wall for the St.Antonys Church, Ammadom, Thrissur.

The writ petition, filed by Mothy D. Pellissery who claims to be an environmental activist, through Adv: Lindons C. Davis, challenges the decision of the ‘Tree Protection Committee’ granting permission to fell the trees standing in front of the St Antonys Church Ammadom, Thrissur and the consequent publication of advertisement by the Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department for auction of the trees so felled.

In the writ petition, a copy of which has been made available to and accessed by the Kerala Law Review, the petitioner states that the Asst. Engineer, PWD roads Division, Cherpu, Thrissur had submitted an application to the Assistant Conservator of Forests Social Forestry for cutting and removing of the trees in the road side (standing in front of St. Anatonys Church) for building a compound wall for the said church. The Assistant Conservator of Forests Social Forestry has inspected the site and found that there is no need to cut down the trees. The petitioner claims that there is no public purpose such as widening of road or development of road in this regard to justify felling of trees. The petitioner has averred in his writ petition that the existence of tree is not at all a hindrance for construction of compound wall, and that the church was renovated and to get the show to the Church the trees are proposed to cut down. “The trees are standing in between the house of the petitioner and church. It is settled law that the citizens have fundamental right for the pure air and good environment. The felling of the trees without any authority infringes the fundamental right of the citizens.”

The petitioner contends that as per “The Kerala Promotion of Tree Growth in non Forest Areas Act, 2005” , social forestry, especially the trees in the road sides are to be protected and planted by including the local public. Also as per the project “vazhiyora Thanal” of Forest department, the local people has got a duty and right to preserve the trees on the road sides.

The petitioner has contended that the committee which took the decision to fell trees standing in front of the Church has neither conducted a site inspection nor called for any complaints against the proposed felling of trees from the local public. “The petitioner’s complaint was also not heard. The committee has not even cared to prepare a report. The feasibility of the alternates other than felling of trees was not considered. The committee has not considered the protection of other trees in that area. The committee has not taken the census of the trees to be protected in the proposed area. The committee has also not even takes the specification of the trees.”, the petition says.

The petitioner has also assailed the decision taken by the ‘Tree Protection Committee’ (of which the District Panchayath president is the Chairman and the Assistant Conservator of Forests Social Forestry is the Convener) on the ground there is no application of mind by the committee on the requests forwarded to them for felling of trees, and that the committee has not been convened properly. The petitioner also alleges that the committee has taken the decision on the pressure of the Panchayath president and the Church, and there is no independent decision by the committee.

The writ petition which has been admitted by the Kerala High Court on 19.11.2014 has been listed for further consideration of the court on 25.11.2014.




Service of order of termination does not give rise to cause of action but only a right of action; writ petition maintainable only in the territorial jurisdiction of the HC where an 'integral part of the cause of action has arisen', rules a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court

A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court comprising Justice Antony Dominic, Justice K. Ramakrishnan and Justice Anil K. Narendran has overruled the dictum laid down in Selvin Abraham v. Punjab & Sind Bank1 and held in Registrar, Indian Maritime University v. V. Viswanathan2 that a writ petition can be entertained only in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which an 'integral part of the cause of action has arisen'. 

 The Full Bench was answering a reference made by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court which had doubted the correctness of Selvin Abraham (supra) on the ground that the same is apparently in conflict with the principles laid down by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Nakul Deo Singh v. Deputy Commissioner3. The Division Bench which made the reference was considering an appeal filed by the Indian Maritime University against the order dated 27.11.2013 of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 22184/2013 holding the writ petition as maintainable after rejecting the objection of the respondent-University that since the entire cause of action had arisen outside Kerala, the writ petition was not maintainable. 

In Selvin Abraham (supra), the correctness of which was doubted by the Division Bench making the reference, while working as Assistant Manager in the Punjab & Sind Bank at Coimbatore, the appellant Selvin Abraham was proceeded against for certain misconduct which culminated in an order of dismissal issued by the Disciplinary authority which order was served on him at his native place in Kerala. His appeal and review against the order of dismissal were also dismissed, whereupon he had filed a writ petition before the Kerala High Court challenging the said orders. The learned Single Judge accepted the objections raised by the Bank that the High Court lacked the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as the entire cause of action arose outside the State.  Selvin Abraham, assailing the judgment of the  learned Single Judge contended before the Division Bench that the order of dismissal became effective only when it was served on him at his address at Kottayam in Kerala and therefore, an integral part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court. The Division Bench accepted the contention of the appellant and held that “an order of dismissal when it becomes effective definitely forms an integral part of the cause of action, and that service of notice of an order of dismissal is not mere service of notice, it definitely gives rise to a cause of action and such service of notice forms an integral part of the cause of action.”

In Nakul Deo Singh v. Deputy Commissioner (supra), the Full Bench had considered the question whether the decision rendered by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court, when communicated to the party while he is within the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court is a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. The Full Bench in Nakul Deo Singh (supra) observed that what really arose for its decision was whether the fact that on communication of the order, it becomes effective as far as the person is concerned, gives him the right to approach the High Court for relief. Answering the reference in that case, the Full Bench had held that receipt of communication by itself does not constitute a cause of action and that at best, receipt of the order or communication only gives the party right of action based on the cause of action which already arose out of the action complained of. On that basis the Full Bench in Nakul Deo Singh (supra) took the view that when the action complained of takes place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and an appeal therefrom is also dismissed by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, cause of action wholly arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court and Article 226(2) of the Constitution cannot be invoked to sustain a writ petition on the basis that an integral part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court. The Full Bench also held that the fact that until it is published or made known, an order does not become effective is not a ground to hold that the communication of the order to the aggrieved person forms part of the cause of action. It was also found by the Full Bench in Nakul Deo Singh (supra) that the fact that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service outside the State, would have to suffer the consequence of the dismissal when he is in his native place is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour. 

In holding that a writ petition can be entertained only in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which an 'integral part of the cause of action has arisen', the Full Bench in Registrar, Indian Maritime University v. V. Viswanathan (supra) inter alia referred to and relied on the principle laid down in the judgment of the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India4 to the effect that  (i) the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus, on the basis whereof, the prayer can be granted and when those facts have no nexus, it cannot be said to be given rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court, and (ii) even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merits, and that in appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. The Full bench also held that it is also a settled principle of law that in a service dispute, issue of an order of termination gives rise to cause of action and service of that communication, though is necessary to give effect to the order, does not amount to a part of the cause of action much less an integral part of the cause of action. In other words, the issue of the order gives rise to the cause of action and the service of the order gives rise to a right of action. 

The Full Bench in Registrar, Indian Maritime University v. V. Viswanathan (supra) after thus considering a catena of decisions on the point held that Selvin Abraham (supra) does not lay down good law as the principles laid down therein are contrary not only to the Full Bench judgment in Nakul Deo Singh (supra) but also to the Apex Court judgments referred to and therefore, overruled the same.  
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1. 2013 KHC 404: 2013 (3) KLT 481
2. 2014 (4) KHC 451 (FB)
3. 1999 KHC 647: 1999 (3) KLT 629
4. 2004 KHC 1435 : 2004(6) SCC 254